In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full co-operation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterise the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (Section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an elementary economic...

A method is presented for computing long-term greenhouse gas emission pathways for both industrial ("Annex B") countries and developing ("non-Annex B") countries. This method combines two main factors: (i) climate protection goals, in the form of targets for stabilising CO2 in the atmosphere,...

This paper focuses on the link between the group co-operation and the unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. As we consider that this last behaviour occurs when bargaining failed, we call it a precautious commitment. We also show that...

We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.

Free-riding is a major problem for international climate policy. A country can take advantage of other countries' emission reduction without contributing to abatement policies itself. Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help to overcome free-riding. Earlier studies suggest that if...

This paper provides an analysis of the effectiveness of climate policies by focusing on the link between policy options on the one hand, and structure of the agreements and of the international regimes on the other hand. In particular, the paper analyses whether there are the conditions for an...

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...

This paper investigates the occurrences at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which took place in The Hague, The Netherlands, from the 13th to 25th November of 2000. Since the conference did not reach an agreement there...

The paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative steady state in the context of a model of climate change. It also explores the possibility of cooperation and attainment of an optimal steady state. It is shown that the problem is similar to that in the static model (Chander and...