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We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608522
We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various oligopoly parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608644
We study a three-country model of international environmental agreements where countries may choose either to limit their emissions or to behave noncooperatively. First, we provide a taxonomy of various kinds of strategic situations. Then, by applying some recently developed game-theoretic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608288
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608381