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Self-regulation and trust under endogenous transaction costs
Sacco, Pier Luigi - 1997
social norms of trust. We find that in certain cases, i.e. when the partnership is very rewarding in absolute terms and the … risk of exploitation from defector partners is relatively low, pure trust may emerge as a social standard of behaviour in a …-phase transition to pure trust may emerge: in the first phase, 'cautious' co-operators who monitor the partner spread over, to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608313
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Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms
Lee, Joosung - 2017
We study mechanisms for environments in which only some of the agents are directly connected to a mechanism designer and the other agents can participate in a mechanism only through the connected agents' referrals. In such environments, the mechanism designer and agents may have different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662437
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Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Cavaliere, Alberto - 1999
Voluntary agreements with industry offer many examples of overcompliance with respect to environmental standards. Such phenomena seem to be irrational but appear less surprising considering firms' strategies are aimed to internalise environmental quality. We model the choice of the environmental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608537
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Under-connected and over-connected networks
Hellmann, Tim; Buechel, Berno - 2009
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279423
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Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Ilkiliç, Rahmi - 2005
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312598
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Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Alexey - 2010
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272417
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Paths to stability in two-sided matching with uncertainty
Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - 2013
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the name but not the type of the other players....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294285
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On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Barbera, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - 2004
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324952
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Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement
Ray, Debraj; Eliaz, Kfir; Razin, Ronny - 2004
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324961
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Single-peakedness and disconnected coalitions
Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2002
Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335684