We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for … efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular …

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its …

Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network …'s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …

small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of … the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of … have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause …

neighbors in the social network. The same activities often exert externalities that cumulate in stocks affecting agents' welfare … instance, care about their friends' health). In such contexts, the patterns of strategic interaction differ from the network of … behavior and key-players tend to move to the periphery of the network, and we discuss the effect of close-knit communities and …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

network exposures. We study the problem of designing a network that provides the right individual incentives. Motivated by … cybersecurity, we first study the situation where the threat to the network comes from an intelligent adversary. We show that, by … addressed by disconnecting the network into two unequal components and sacri ficing some nodes. At high costs, under …