structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved - namely, core stability and internal … coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed "potential … internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing …

sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation …. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and –whenever this is possible– they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic or … pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to existing approaches …

'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or … split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in …