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Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas F.; Di Giannatale, Sonia - 2010

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272767

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players …, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400

Bidding for Conservation Contracts

di Corato, Luca; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2014

require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost … views non-enforcement of contract terms as a source of real-options, the paper offers the following contributions. First, it … play in avoiding such potential bias in contract allocation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398445

Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2017

suppliers, facing variable production costs, must simultaneously report the contract price and the cost level at which they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662412

Bidding for complex projects: Evidence from the acquisitions of IT services

Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto - 2008

Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279400

Alliance formation and coercion in networks

Hiller, Timo - 2011

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279538

Procurement with unenforceable contract time and the law of liquidated damages

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - 2012

. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time … when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282956

Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret

Gallice, Andrea - 2006

We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players' beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312257

Bilateral Commitment

Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - 2006

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312258

The Allocation of European Union Allowances: Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles

Buchner, Barbara K.; Carraro, Carlo; Ellerman, A. Denny - 2006

This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, edited by the co-authors and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. The main objective of this paper is to distill the lessons and general principles to be learnt from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312262