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Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328699
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Multiple membership and federal structures
Le Breton, Michel; Makarov, Valery; Savvateev, Alexei; … - 2008
We consider a model of the 'world' with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270924
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Computational complexity in additive hedonic games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao-chin - 2008
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279421
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Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - 2009
equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279626
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Equilibrium and matching under price controls
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2015
(1986) as special cases. The paper presents a notion of competitive equilibrium, called Drèze equilibrium, for this class of … controls. It is shown that Drèze equilibrium allocations are equivalent to allocations induced by stable outcomes. One … implication is the existence of Drèze equilibria. Another implication is the equivalence of a competitive equilibrium concept and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307296
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The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands
Nieva, Ricardo - 2015
bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307304
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Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options
Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - 2004
.e. independent of the actions of other players), there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium resulting in efficient outcomes when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324948
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Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325075
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Free Trade Networks
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - 2003
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325086
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Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144