International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement, which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The paper analyses this problem from the...

We build a simple model of legal dualism in which a pro-poor legal reform, under certain conditions, causes the conflicting custom to go some way toward producing the change intended by the legislator. It then acts as an 'outside anchor' that exerts a 'magnet effect' on the custom. We illustrate...

The aim of this paper is to investigate, empirically, what components of the public spending imply a decreasing effect on the organized crime and what components create opportunities for the organized crime, discussing also the role of government efficiency. The findings show a strikingly...

We investigate the origin, impact and evolution of citizenship laws. Citizenship laws originate from the common and civil law traditions, which apply jus soli and jus sanguinis, respectively. We compile a data set across countries of the world starting from the 19th century. The impact of the...

We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not...

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal...

We argue that in an unreliable enforcement regime, transactions tend to become intermediated through institutions or concentrated among agents bound by some form of private enforcement. Provision of funding shifts from risk capital to debt, and from markets to institutions with long term...

Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...

An environmental agreement in an oligopolistic market may violate the competition rules, as described in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Ordinarily, some collusion among firms is necessary for an environmental agreement to be successful. This collusion may be acceptable when it relates to the...

For a long time social sciences scholars from different fields have devoted their attention to identifying the causes leading to commit criminal offences and recently lots of studies have included the analysis of spatial effects. Respect to the Italian crime phenomenon some stylized facts exist:...