Showing 81 - 90 of 161
This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324978
This paper provides evidence of bounded rationality by large dealers in U.S. Treasury auctions. I argue that these … auctions are precisely such economic agents. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325017
We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by the organizer of an auction. Commissions are similar to taxes imposed on buyers and sellers and the economic problem that results looks similar to the question of tax incidence in consumer economics. We argue,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325020
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325021
We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation … values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's conditional … different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price ("scaled") sales often argued to fit a private values …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325023
auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the issuer using book-building were advertising …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325024
We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325050
This paper develops a theory of multiple unit auctions with short squeezes in the post- auction market. This is … discriminatory price auctions in a true multiple unit setting, where bidders can submit multiple bids for multiple units. Our model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325052
We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325053
We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' demand schedules in Finnish Treasury … auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may … that the auctions are part of a repeated game between the Treasury and the primary dealers. Empirically, the main driver …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325054