We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed 'hard' information about the board's...

This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the...

We characterize how the size distribution of plants, within narrowly defined industries, changed in Italy over a ten-year time span, and relate this to the stock of civic capital at the provincial level. Data on plant size come from the 1991 and 2001 Italian censuses. Civic capital turns out to...

This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies....

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the...

What legal, political and economic institutions are shaping privatisations processes in the world? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence for a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical analysis for the period 1977-1996, the decision to privatise appears to be related to...

We argue that in an unreliable enforcement regime, transactions tend to become intermediated through institutions or concentrated among agents bound by some form of private enforcement. Provision of funding shifts from risk capital to debt, and from markets to institutions with long term...

This paper provides an empirical analysis of GovernmentsÕ decisions to sell privatised companies on both international and domestic markets in a sample of 392 privatisations in 42 countries in the 1977-1998 period. Political theories of privatisation find strong support in our analyses: market...

We study the evolution of the control structure of 141 privatized firms from OECD countries over the period from 1996 through 2000. We find that governments do not relinquish control after "privatization." We show that the market-to-book ratios of privatized firms converge through time to those...

This paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977-99 period. The empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries, endowed with deep and liquid stock markets, and...