This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The … experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing … private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents …

Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of … network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent …. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable …

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can … their communication links with upfront transfers. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for … efficient equilibria and shows the prevalence of strategic delays. If the underlying network is either complete or circular …

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its …

Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network …'s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …

small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of … the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of … have higher betweenness centrality: they are the brokers who connect different parts of the network. Ignorant agents cause …

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming … related either to accounting for a specific type of externality, or to dealing with the combinatorial nature of network …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players …