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Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - 2004

's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize …, hence transfers can be made contingent on the new information accruing after the merger. Second, we study the case of … identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. In the second case, we show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324884

A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 1998

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608412

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - 2005

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355

A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - 2006

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312367

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - 2004

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312413

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - 2007

-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312580

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - 2006

the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312597

Multiple membership and federal structures

Le Breton, Michel; Makarov, Valery; Savvateev, Alexei; … - 2008

We consider a model of the 'world' with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270924

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - 2004

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324948

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme ('differential tax') introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324997