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Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - 2004

's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize …, hence transfers can be made contingent on the new information accruing after the merger. Second, we study the case of … identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. In the second case, we show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324884

A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 1998

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608412

Multiple membership and federal structures

Le Breton, Michel; Makarov, Valery; Savvateev, Alexei; … - 2008

We consider a model of the 'world' with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270924

Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games

Morelli, Massimo - 1998

This paper provides a co-operative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of weighted majority games. The co-operative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, yields a meaningful selection within the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, it contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608407

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - 2004

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324948

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme ('differential tax') introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324997

Allocation Rules for Network Games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325073

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325084

The γ-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - 2003

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325128

Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144