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Stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations
Pintassilgo, Pedro; Finus, Michael; Lindroos, Marko; … - 2008
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270930
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Why are Trade Agreements Regional?
Zissimos, Ben - 2007
familiar problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312565
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Environmental liability and technology choice: A duopolistic analysis
Mondello, Gérard; Tidball, Mabel - 2000
This paper focuses both on the competition process and the firms liability in environmental protection and the demonstration is made by comparing two models of safety investment. The rst one shows sensitive players to their environmental liability: they seek to minimize the technologies accident...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608595
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Extrapolation in games of coordination and dominance solvable games
Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - 2010
dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 … dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong … the Coordination games. Playing a strategically similar game before leads to faster convergence to Nash equilibrium in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272485
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(Anti-) coordination in networks
Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, José Gabriel - 2010
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their … neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which … of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272506
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Incorporating fairness motives into the impulse balance equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium concepts: An application to 2x2 games
Tavoni, Alessandro - 2009
Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279402
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Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Gallice, Andrea - 2006
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players' beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312257
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Repeated games played in a network
Kinateder, Markus - 2008
bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270931
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Dynamics and limited cooperation in international environmental agreements
Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep - 1998
The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608372
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Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Dawson, Na Li; Segerson, Kathleen - 2000
We develop a multiple-firm model of an industry's voluntary adoption of environmental protection measures to achieve a predetermined industry-wide emissions reduction target under an explicit threat of imposition of an emissions tax. We examine the free-riding incentive of individual firms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608635