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Credible group stability in multi-partner matching problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001927948

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

Stable matchings for the room-mates problem

Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001927856

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684921