We propose a metric of financial stability that is a weighted average of the probability of default and the equity of each country. The weights are obtained in the VAR and must reflect that the welfare changes due to financial instability are produced primarily through changes of the probability...

Many institutional changes have taken place to payments systems. Indeed, they have been in continual change ever since money first emerged as the dominant technology for conducting transactions. Means of settlement between banks have changed: cheques replaced cash in many transactions, and they...

On the macro-economic policy side of Central Banking a remarkable consensus has been emerging over the last two decades. This covers both the applicable theoretical framework for analysing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and also the appropriate institutional structure for the...

We define a non-tâtonnement dynamics in continuous-time for pure exchange economies with outside and inside fiat money. Traders are myopic, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and play dominant strategies in a short-run monetary strategic market game involving the limit-price mechanism. The...

This paper contains a General Equilibrium model of an economy with Incomplete Markets (GEI) with money and default. The model is a simplified version of the real world consisting of a non-bank private sector, banks, a Central Bank, a government and a regulator. The model is used to analyse...

This paper first extends the canonical General Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets (GEI) model with money and default to allow for competitive banking and financial instability. Second, it introduces capital requirements for the banking sector to assess the short and medium term macroeconomic...

This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003,2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be...

The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private...

We show, in an exchange economy with default, liquidity constraints and no aggregate uncertainty, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). Two...

This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit `excessive' risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to...