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Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 927-970

We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104602

Common enrollment in school choice

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1237-1270

Increasingly, more school districts across the US are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that, across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158787

School choice under partial fairness

Dur, Umut Mert; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yılmaz, Özgür - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1309-1346

the Student Exchange under Partial Fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is … not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e. constrained efficient in the class of partially stable … matchings). Moreover, any constrained efficient matching that Pareto improves upon a partially stable matching can be obtained …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158795

Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 431-466

one-sided matching problem with agents having dichotomous types. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686695

Effective affirmative action in school choice

Hafalir, Isa Emin; Yenmez, M. Bumin; Yıldırım, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 325-363

action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686710

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320

Reason-based choice : a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 125-162

Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690873

Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory

Fleurbaey, Marc; Roemer, John E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 289-310

Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694978

A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)

Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 109-125

We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695066

A theory of political gridlock

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586

This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704960