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Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type

Kambe, Shinsuke - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 849-886

This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104573

Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 817-861

I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705208

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720

Ashamed to be selfish

Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 99-124

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690900

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635255

Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games

Matthews, Steven A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 365-403

general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the …) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686703

Benchmarking

Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 485-504

We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856668

The property rights theory of production networks

Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1619-1658

and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local … monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous production network. Our analysis generalizes the exclusion core, a … necessary) conditions for the nonemptiness of the exclusion core. Multisourcing and a bias toward shorter supply chains emerge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135367

Matching while learning

Johari, Ramesh; Kamble, Vijay; Kanoria, Yash - In: Operations research 69 (2021) 2, pp. 655-681

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012533563