The purpose of the present paper is to explore the existing literature on auctions in the energy markets, and to investigate whether the most recent developments in the auction literature can help us to identify issues related with market power, collusion, efficiency and consumer welfare, all of...

Electricity markets are becoming more integrated around the world. However, the knowledge of the effects of different auction formats on suppliers' strategies in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs is still very limited. In this paper, I analyze the performance of...

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We...

The theory of infinitely repeated games finds that players will likely learn to collude, given sufficient incentive to do so, enabling them to capture greater payoffs than those attainable in the static setting. The theory posits that cooperation can arise in this framework if individuals...