This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm....

We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with homogeneous goods, where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, our main results are that (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii)...

This paper investigates how CSR firms influence a Cournot oligopoly with pollution. We define as CSR a firm that takes into account not only its profits but also internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to consumer surplus. The CSR firm obtains higher profits compared to...

We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment...

This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a market where profit-maximizing and CSR firms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer...

We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where firms' output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full-fledged model in which (i)...

We investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product monopolist investing in cost-reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product. There emerges that the firm's relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluency, measured by...

We extend a well known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the...