Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Cover Image
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (Second Version)
Liu, Qingmin - 2012
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098363
Cover Image
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Qingmin - 2013
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080181
Cover Image
Matching with Incomplete Information
Liu, Quingmin - 2012
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101438
Cover Image
'Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets' Second Version
Mailath, George J. - 2010
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values - the values to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135445
Cover Image
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
Mailath, George J. - 2012
surplus in the absence of interagent transfers. Most of the work in the large bargaining-and matching literature ignores this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109179
Cover Image
Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
Mailath, George J. - 2013
We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074370
Cover Image
Pricing in Matching Markets
Mailath, George J. - 2010
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices --- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148527
Cover Image
Reputation Effects
Mailath, George J. - 2007
This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007) are stated and discussed
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223232
Cover Image
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
Bhaskar, V. - 2012
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098365
Cover Image
A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games
Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009
We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654