Showing 1 - 8 of 8
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values - the values to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135445
surplus in the absence of interagent transfers. Most of the work in the large bargaining-and matching literature ignores this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109179
We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074370
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices --- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148527
strategically. Consumers search for high quality firms and condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers. When they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725668
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098363
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101438
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080181