Showing 1 - 7 of 7
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734128
We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027049
We use a large dataset on retail pricing to document that a sizeable portion of the cross-sectional variation in the price at which the same good trades in the same period and in the same market is due to the fact that stores that are, on average, equally expensive set persistently different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000694
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213898
We introduce a new class of preferences — which we call additive-belief-based (ABB) —that captures a general and yet tractable approach to belief-based utility, and that encompasses many popular models in the behavioral literature. We show that the general class of ABB preferences and two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014096033
We study a two-stage choice problem. In the first stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a set of payoff-allocations between herself and a passive recipient. In the second stage, DM chooses an allocation from the set. The recipient is only aware of the second stage choice. Choosing selfishly in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208757