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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Mailath, George J. - 2015

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028016

Information Structures with Unawareness

Li, Jing - 2008

I construct a state space model with unawareness following Aumann (1976). Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) show that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result by endowing the agent with a subjective state space that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216943

Interactive Knowledge with Unawareness

Li, Jing - 2008

This paper extends Li (2008b) to the multi-agent environment, where players reason about each other's awareness as well as knowledge, subject to their own awareness constraints. I characterize the interactive knowledge hierarchies under unawareness, which significantly differ from those in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216944

Modelilng Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces

Li, Jing - 2008

I develop a set-theoretic model of unawareness without making any structural assumptions on the underlying state space. Unawareness is characterized as a measurability constraint that results in players' reasoning about a "coarse" subjective algebra of events. The model is shown to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216977

A Note on Unawareness and Zero Probability

Li, Jing - 2008

I study how choice behavior given unawareness of an event differs from choice behavior given subjective belief of zero probability on that event. Depending on different types of unawareness the decision-maker suffers, behavior under unawareness is either incomparable with that under zero...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723898

Additive-Belief-Based Preferences

Dillenberger, David; Raymond, Collin - 2020

We introduce a new class of preferences — which we call additive-belief-based (ABB) —that captures a general and yet tractable approach to belief-based utility, and that encompasses many popular models in the behavioral literature. We show that the general class of ABB preferences and two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014096033

Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers : Results from a Social Experiment In Mexican High Schools

Behrman, Jere R.; Parker, Susan; Todd, Petra; Wolpin, … - 2021

This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentives schemes using data from a social experiment … that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group …. Treatment one provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213719

Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs Under Conditional Independence

Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110135

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

Bhaskar, V. - 2007

This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729368

Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2019 - This Version: April 26, 2019

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065313