Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010670654
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587848
A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568127
make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008751337
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456313
We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700277
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126688
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126728
This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007) are stated and discussed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061925