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Modeling the Evolution of Expectations and Uncertainty in General Equilibrium

Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

models. A central insight consists of recognizing that the evolution of agents. beliefs can be captured by defining a set of …. Once this kind of structure is imposed, it is possible to create a mapping between the evolution of agents’ beliefs and …. Therefore, agents form expectations taking into account that their beliefs will evolve according to what they observe in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671446

Modeling the Evolution of Expectations and Uncertainty in General Equilibrium

Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

models. A central insight consists of recognizing that the evolution of agents' beliefs can be captured by defining a set of …. Once this kind of structure is imposed, it is possible to create a mapping between the evolution of agents' beliefs and …. Therefore, agents form expectations taking into account that their beliefs will evolve according to what they observe in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822902

Preferences vs. Opportunities: Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage in the United States

Shin, Seul-Ki - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2014

This paper develops and implements a new approach for separately identifying preference and opportunity parameters of a two-sided search and matching model in the absence of data on choice sets. This approach exploits information on the dynamics of matches: how long it takes for singles to form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970514

Common Learning

Cripps, Martin W.; Ely, Jeffrey C.; Mailath, George J.; … - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2007

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005020651

The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, Third Version

Persico, Nicola; Postlewaite, Andrew; Silverman, Dan - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001

Taller workers receive a wage premium. Net of differences in family background, the disparity is similar in magnitude to the race and gender gaps. We exploit variation in an individual’s height over time to explore how height affects wages. Controlling for teen height essentially eliminates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150202

A Search Theory of Rigid Prices

Menzio, Guido - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2007

In this paper, I build a model marketplace populated by a finite number of sellers – each producing its own variety of the good – and a continuum of buyers–each searching for a variety he likes. Using the model, I study the response of a seller’s price to privately observed fluctuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150207

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard

Dilmé, Francesc - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2012

Asymmetric information is an important source of inefficiency when assets (like firms) are transacted. The two main sources of this asymmetry are unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the asset (for example, quality) and unobserved idiosyncratic choices (actions done by the current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540631

The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation

Akcigit, Ufuk; Liu, Qingmin - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

Technological progress is typically a result of trial-and-error research by competing firms. While some research paths lead to the innovation sought, others result in dead ends. Because firms benefit from their competitors working in the wrong direction, they do not reveal their dead-end...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366835

Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination

Huang, Chong - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

How does the central bank's incentive to build a reputation affect speculators' ability to coordinate and the likelihood of the devaluation outcome during speculative currency crises? What role does market information play in speculators' coordination and the central bank's reputation building?...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366836

Efficient Learning, Job Turnover and Wage Dispersion

Li, Fei - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

, taking the history of realized production as signals. Heterogeneity in beliefs about the match quality and in the job search …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366838