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Optimal Redistribution with Unobservable Preferences for an Observable Merit Good.
Racionero, M.D.M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
This paper considers a government that seeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discourage the consumption … income and in their preferences for the merit good. The government can perfectly observe the level of consumption of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779483
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Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.
Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077
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A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria.
De Sinopoli, F.; Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000
In this paper we show that in a simple spacital model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if … government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democraty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634095
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Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure.
Boadway, R.; Marchand, M.; Pestieau, P.; Del Mar … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
heterogeneous. Individuals differ in their ability and in their preferences for leisure. The government seeks to redistribute income …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634141
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Subgame Perfection in a "Divided Government" Model.
Iannantuoni. G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
Purely non-cooperative principles, as itereted dominance and backward induction, explain divided government. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634181
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Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.
Bloch, F.; Rottier, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947
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Lobbying in Public Decision Making.
Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized … interests. We identify the following trade-off : competition yields a higher transfer to the government, but the outcome of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949
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Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: the Design of the Tax Structure Revisited.
Cremer, H.; Pestieau, P.; Rochet, J.-C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
This paper studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix in a setting where individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). Tax instruments (income and commodity taxes) are constrained solely by the information structure.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669227
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Debt-Sharing and Secession: a Generational Accounting Approach.
Cattoir, P.; Docquier, F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2000
This paper investigates one of the most important financial issues arising from a secession or a country partitioning, namely the sharing ot the national public debt. Extending Dreze's distributive neutrlaity condition, we use the generational accounting technique and propose a dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669335