Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...

At a Nash-Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash-Walras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate byt Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

In this paper we exploit global analysis to explore welfare properties of a standard one-commodity GEI, under different notions of constrained Pareto optimality. In a unifying framework we revise and extend some of the leading results of the literature on incomplete markets and government...

In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

In this paper we investigate the welfare effect of capital income taxation in a standard one commodity general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) and production. We consider a competitive economy of two periods with uncertainty over a finite number S of possible states of nature...

We consider social insurance schemes with a two-part benefit formula: a flat (constant) term and a variable term which is proportional to individuals' contributions. The factor of proportionality defines the type of social insurance. We adopt a two-stage political economy approach. At the first,...