The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an … application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher … expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking …

standard auctions that allocate the good to the highest bidder. Instead, the auctioneer better exploits bidder preferences by …

The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We … analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only …

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …