We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a …

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 …

We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary …

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …

We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules … market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. Both the HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues …