Similar Search Results

Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751

Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795

Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets

Cramton, Peter; Cameron, Lisa J.; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988800