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Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751
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Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002
This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795
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Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England
Cramton, Peter; Chao, Hung-po; Wilson, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2005
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988750