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Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751

Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795

Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently

Cramton, Peter; Gibbons, Robert; Klemperer, Paul - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1987

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim- individually-...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988765