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Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design … individual-license pricing when licenses are complementary. In simultaneous ascending-price auctions, from a bidder's perspective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988763

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988793

Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction … summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with … combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988797

Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2008

A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997803

Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2007

Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market. Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared at the price that balances supply and demand. Buyers with bids above the clearing price pay that price, and suppliers with offers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997808

A Capacity Market that Makes Sense

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2005

We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, and present a design that avoids the many problems found in the early capacity markets. The proposed locational capacity market pays suppliers based on their demonstrated ability to supply energy or reserves in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997810

Colombia Firm Energy Market

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2007

A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provide energy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia’s hydro-dominated electricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in new resources to assure that sufficient firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997811

The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2006

This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997824

Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market

Cramton, Peter; Stoft, Steven; West, Jeffrey - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2006

We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997827