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Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
Cramton, Peter; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Ozbay, Erkut; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2010
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules … market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. Both the HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460856
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Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses
Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997
licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design … individual-license pricing when licenses are complementary. In simultaneous ascending-price auctions, from a bidder's perspective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988763
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Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998
An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988793
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Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions
Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997
We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction … summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with … combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988797
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Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
Cramton, Peter; Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2009
We analyze a discrete clock auction with lowest-accepted bid (LAB) pricing and provisional winners, as adopted by India for its 3G spectrum auction. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the provisional winner shades her bid while provisional losers do not. Such differential shading leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997809
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Fear of Losing in a Clock Auction
Cramton, Peter; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Ozbay, Erkut; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2012
We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575705
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Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
Cramton, Peter; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Ozbay, Erkut; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2012
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules … market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. In theory, both the HRB and LAB auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575731