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Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751

Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795

Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?

Cramton, Peter; Kahn, Alfred E.; Porter, Robert H.; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2001

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988756

Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond

Cramton, Peter; Kahn, Alfred E.; Porter, Robert H.; … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988794