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A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878412
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988748
ISO New England proposes reserve markets designed to improve the existing forward reserve market and improve pricing during real-time reserve shortages. We support all of the main elements of the proposal. For example, we agree that little is gained by allowing reserve availability bids in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988750
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988755
Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988756
I review the performance of the operating reserves and the operable capability markets in New England. The review covers the first four months of operation from May 1 to August 31, 1999. The review is based on my knowledge of the market rules and their implementation by the ISO, and the market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988759
collusion. The prices that prevailed in California during the time period between May 2000 and December 2001—while often higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988762
New England’s wholesale electricity market has been in operation, since May 1, 1999. When the market began it was understood that the rules were not perfect (Cramton and Wilson 1998). However, it was decided that it was better to start the market with imperfect rules, rather than postpone the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988769
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. Common bidding behavior such as "hockey stick" bids easily are explained by suppliers determining their supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988778
This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988790