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Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2012

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878412

The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to … May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned … efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988761

Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design … individual-license pricing when licenses are complementary. In simultaneous ascending-price auctions, from a bidder's perspective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988763

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1998

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988793

Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions

Cramton, Peter; McMillan, John; Milgrom, Paul; Miller, … - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1997

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction … summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with … combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988797

A Review of the L-Band Auction

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2008

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997807

Spectrum Auction Design

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2009

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard …. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a … tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997818

A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2008

In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997820

Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Day, Robert - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2008

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997825

Auctioning the Digital Dividend

Cramton, Peter - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2009

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997826