The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …

be tailored to limit collusion. …

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to … May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned … efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition …

licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design … individual-license pricing when licenses are complementary. In simultaneous ascending-price auctions, from a bidder's perspective …

the spectrum auctions in the United States. I will discuss spectrum auction successes, failures, and what I think are key … issues in upcoming spectrum auctions. …

We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we …