An auction design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment is presented. The design addresses the flaws in the current program. Bids are binding commitments. Each bid binds the bidder to particular performance obligations depending on the auction outcome. The bids are made credible through a...

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments...

The best sites for offshore wind farms on the US Outer Continental Shelf are scarce. To make the best use of this scarce resource, it is necessary to implement a fair and efficient mechanism to assign leases to companies that are most likely to develop off-shore wind energy projects. Coastal...

An improved system and method for a computer-implemented auction in which multiple types of items are auctioned together without imposing a particular division of supply or demand among the individual types of items. In some embodiments the auction of the present invention provides a means or...

My remarks are about spectrum policy, especially a much needed enhancement, incentive auctions. Incentive auctions would allow the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to conduct two-sided auctions—auctions that simultaneously free-up encumbered spectrum and put it to its best use.

Our Economists’ Voice column of October 2010 summarized the severe problems with the current and proposed Medicare auctions. The column was based on a careful reading and analysis of the auction rules. Since that time we and other auction experts have studied the Medicare auctions with theory,...

The present invention is a system and method to sell or procure complementary goods. A complementary good according to the invention is a good whose value or utility is enhanced when paired with another good, such a pair of goods is a communications license to encumbered spectrum and a...

We are economists, computer scientists, and operation researchers with expertise in the theory and practice of auctions. We write to express our concerns with the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program for Durable Medical Equipment operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. We...

The emerging field of market design applies auctions and matching to solve resource allocation problems. This paper focuses on auction design, the branch of market design where money is used to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. Within auctions, the paper examines applications...

On 11 September 2012, the Subcommittee on Healthcare and Technology of the United States House Committee on Small Business led by Chairwoman Renee Ellmers (R-NC) and Ranking Member Cedric Richmond (D-LA) held a hearing on Medicare’s Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program, which...