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Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710013
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The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences
Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359504
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Investment and Concern for Relative Position
Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359510
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Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359515
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Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359522
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359530
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709973
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Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy
Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Penn Economics Department
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828328