Previous models of collective action assume that the network structure of individual relations that transmit social control mechanisms promoting or inhibiting collective action is given. An extended game-theoretical model that incorporates social control mechanisms as side payments and allows...

We study the implications of social interactions and individual learning features on consumer demand in a simple market model. We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities. Given a fixed price, agents repeatedly decide whether or not to buy a unit of a...

In order to maximize cost efficiency from scarce marketing resources, marketers are facing the problem of which group of consumers to target for promotions. We propose to use a decision theoretical approach to model this strategic situation. According to one promotion model that we develop,...

A simple model of a buying–selling cycle is proposed. It is based on a notion of a profit intensity. Supply and demand curves and geometrical interpretation are discussed in this context.

A new approach for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is suggested. On the basis of psychological concepts (as for instance social norms and cultural coordinates), we deduce a general mechanism for social aggregation in which different clusters of individuals can merge according...

We study the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where the players are located on the nodes of a random scale-free network. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a powerful tool and has been used for the study of mutual trust and cooperation among individuals in structured populations. We vary the...

We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player’s next action. To examine the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are used and confronted against numerical simulations and...

We present an extensive, systematic study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games on a square lattice under a synchronous, noiseless imitation dynamics. We show that for both the occupancy of the network and the (random) mobility of the agents there are intermediate values that may...