Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Policymakers all over the world claim: no innovation without protection. For more than a century, critics have objected that the case for intellectual property is far from clear. This paper uses a game theoretic model to organise the debate. It is possible to model innovation as a prisoner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264808
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the e ect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of 'independent strategies' as well as of 'common priors' are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270432
Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show that Nash equilibria are rarely played and that subjects may be thinking only a finite number of iterations. We study one of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478910
In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286719
Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. In this paper, we propose a very simple and light-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation by controlling experiences, more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281841
The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286705
Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given specification of posteriors of different players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286729