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Competition as a socially desirable dilemma theory vs. experimental evidence

Engel, Christoph - 2009

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain … oligopoly as a linear public good. -- Cartel ; Oligopoly ; Bertrand ; Cournot ; Public Good ; Externality ; Experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116

Das institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäre Wettbewerbsleitbild

Mantzabinos, Chrysostomos - 2004

In diesem Aufsatz wird ein Wettbewerbsleitbild vorgeschlagen, das auf den Ergebnissen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik und der Evolutorischen Ökonomik aufbaut. Um ein Leitbild zu gewinnen braucht man zweierlei, d.h. erfahrungswissenschaftliche Grundlagen und Überlegungen zu der Behandlung von...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011581950

The Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model

Mantzabinos, Chrysostomos - 2004

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582635

Das institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäre Wettbewerbsleitbild

Mantzabinos, Chrysostomos - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001967386

Cartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in German coal mining, 1881-1913

Burhop, Carsten; Lübbers, Thorsten - 2008

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany's main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264842

Is cartelisation profitable? A case study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913

Lübbers, Thorsten - 2009

precisely, we consider the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, a coal cartel that operated in Imperial Germany in the late 19th … event study methodology to asses the reaction of the stock market to the foundation of the cartel and two major revisions of … data in a dynamic panel data framework. Overall, our results suggest that the investigated cartel had no significant effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266957

Tacit collusion : the neglected experimental evidence

Engel, Christoph - 2015

Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483415

Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma : an experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011

cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475

Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion

Normann, Hans-Theo - 2008

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003861823

Is cartelisation profitable? ; a case study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913

Lübbers, Thorsten - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862293