Showing 1 - 10 of 117
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522109
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
In recent debates, morality or social norms have been proposed as an instrument to reduce conflict behavior. As the … question in the framework of contest theory, we find that if morality can discriminate between appropriation and defense, it is … discriminate between these different conflict efforts, strategic effects due to a one-sided increase in morality might actually …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264774
One possible solution to mitigate the negative influences of conflict which has been proposed in the literature is to … increasing an individual's social capital will lead her to reduce her conflict effort, whereas increasing her human capital can … induce her to increase her conflict effort. We then analyze which conditions need to be present to induce the individuals to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264810
a way out. In the area of content regulation, transnational conflict is no less pronounced. The Europeans are … strategic. Organizing co-existence in both areas presupposes overcoming a strategic conflict. But in data protection, this … typically is a one-to-one conflict, while in content regulation the typical conflict is of a one-to-many nature. In public goods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582891
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003108896
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348184
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor´s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348185
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in models with a continuum of types. We interpret their condition as significantly stronger version of the requirement of injectiveness of the function mapping abstract types into beliefs and prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348187
In a large economy, a first-best provison rule for a public good is robustly implementable with budget balance because no one individual alone can affect the aggregate outcome. First-best outcomes can, however, be blocked by coalitions of agents acting in concert. With a requirement of immunity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348188