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Win shift lose stay : an experimental test of non-compete clauses
Bünstorf, Guido; Engel, Christoph; Fischer, Sven; … - 2013
We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on working efforts. The employee can invest into the probability of making a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation (Win) the employee may want to leave the firm (Shift) whereas after an innovation failure (Lose)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194567
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Bargaining in the absence of property rights : an experiment
Bar-Gill, Oren; Engel, Christoph - 2015
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial alloca-tion of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397620
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Voice effects on attitudes towards an impartial decision maker : experimental evidence
Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013
The opportunity to voice one's opinion about a decision is a fundamental aspect of procedural fairness and applies to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771811
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How voice shapes reactions to impartial decision makers : an experiment
Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013 - revised version February 2014
We study how participation in decision processes shapes people's behavior towards impartial authorities. In an incentivized laboratory experiment, an impartial decision maker at first decides about the allocation of money between two subordinates. Treatments differ in the opportunity for one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010258889
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How to protect entitlements : an experiment
Bar-Gill, Oren; Engel, Christoph - 2017
usually have incomplete information about fairness norms held by the other party - fairness norms that affect the other party …'s willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). Importantly, these fairness norms may depend on how strongly the … participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three different fairness norms: negative types whose WTP and WTA are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633871
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When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013
Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323844
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Ex interim voting in public good provision
Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2006
We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is ¯nally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264801
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On the prevalence of framing effects across subject-pools in a two-person cooperation game
Goerg, Sebastian J.; Walkowitz, Gari - 2010
In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270441
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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion: Bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478916
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Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma: An experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843