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On the existence and prevention of asset price bubbles
Enders, Zeno; Hakenes, Hendrik - 2010
We develop a model of rational bubbles based on the assumptions of unknown market liquidity and limited liability of … condition for whether rational bubbles are possible. Based on this analysis, we discuss several widely-discussed policy measures … with respect to their effectiveness in preventing bubbles. A reduction of manager bonuses or a Tobin tax can create or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008738294
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The expected externality mechanism in a Level-k environment
Gorelkina, Olga - 2015
Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show … of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design theory, the expected externality mechanism (DÁspremont, Gerard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010471710
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On the existence and prevention of asset price bubbles
Enders, Zeno; Hakenes, Hendrik - 2010
We develop a model of rational bubbles based on the assumptions of unknown market liquidity and limited liability of … condition for whether rational bubbles are possible. Based on this analysis, we discuss several widely-discussed policy measures … with respect to their effectiveness in preventing bubbles. A reduction of manager bonuses or a Tobin tax can create or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286704
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Bank bonuses and bail-outs
Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - 2013
This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702894
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Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets : a Cournot convergence approach
Hellwig, Martin (contributor) - 2004
The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002526020
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Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2009
For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877136
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How to determine whether regional markets are integrated? : theory and evidence from European electricity markets
Gebhardt, Georg (contributor); Höffler, Felix (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003591236
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Transaction costs, liquidity and expected returns at the Berlin stock exchange, 1892-1913
Burhop, Carsten; Gelman, Sergey - 2010
We estimate effective spreads and round-trip transaction costs at the Berlin Stock Exchange for the period 1892-1913 using daily stock market returns for a sample of 27 stocks. Our results show that transaction costs at the main stock exchange in a bank-based financial system at the turn of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971233
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An experimental contribution to the theory of customary (international) law
Engel, Christoph - 2010
In their majority, public international lawyers postulate that for a new rule of customary law to originate, two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be consistent practice, and it must be shown that this practice is motivated by the belief that such behaviour is required in law. Maurice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961993
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Beliefs, payoffs, information : on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2012 - First version: December 1, 2008, This version: March 23, 2012
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230371