Showing 1 - 10 of 216
givingimitators a free lunch does not have a chilling effect on innovation. -- innovation ; imitation ; appropriation ; patent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742356
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478916
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843
In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003978627
expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573481
Legal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009161317
In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009314550
If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433920