We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

We study the effect of voting when insiders´ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is …

situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is …

We study the effect of voting when insiders ́public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the … splitting their votes, or they coordinate but cannot aggregate information. With approval voting, expected welfare is strictly … equilibrium under plurality. Which one is selected depends on the size of the minority. Approval voting vastly outperforms …