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The joint benefits of observed and unobserved punishment : comment to unobserved punishment supports cooperation
Glöckner, Andreas; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2011
Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment … results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved punishment is unleashed when combined with observable punishment …. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups - strikingly, even with less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380662
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Asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Normann, Hans-Theo; Wallace, Brian - 2009
We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862419
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Mechanism design and voting for public-good provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2011
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488631
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Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305201
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Public-good provision in large economies : robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
In a large economy, a first-best provison rule for a public good is robustly implementable with budget balance because no one individual alone can affect the aggregate outcome. First-best outcomes can, however, be blocked by coalitions of agents acting in concert. With a requirement of immunity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334017
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Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing : A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics
Hellwig, Martin - 2004
The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274198
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The joint benefits of observed and unobserved punishment: Comment to unobserved punishment supports cooperation
Glöckner, Andreas; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2011
Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment … results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved punishment is unleashed when combined with observable punishment …. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups - strikingly, even with less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286696
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Leading with(out) sacrifice? : a public-goods experiment with a super-additive player
Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian - 2009
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862276
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The jurisdiction of the man within : introspection, identity, and cooperation in a public good experiment
Engel, Christoph; Kurschilgen, Michael - 2015
According to Adam Smith (1790), human selfishness can be restrained by introspection. We test the effect of introspection on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Drawing on the concept of identity utility (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000), we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459020
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Competitive equilibrium in markets for votes
Casella, Alessandra; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Palfrey, … - 2012
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibriumwe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500733