Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 103
Cover Image
You are in charge: Experimentally testing the motivating power of holding a judicial office
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2016
reliable job at overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities "public official" or "judge" increases their sensitivity … towards the degree by which individuals are selfish, and it reduces the effect of their social value orientation (making them … to their social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580499
Cover Image
You are in charge : experimentally testing the motivating power of holding a judicial office
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2016
reliable job at overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities "public official" or "judge" increases their sensitivity … towards the degree by which individuals are selfish, and it reduces the effect of their social value orientation (making them … to their social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553361
Cover Image
The German elections in the 1870s: why Germany turned from liberalism to protectionism
Lehmann, Sibylle H. - 2009
In 1878 the liberal parties lost enough votes to loose the majority in the parliament which they had defended in the general election just one year before. In this paper, the question of where the voters came from and why the voting changed so crucially within one year are re-examined. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266984
Cover Image
The German elections in the 1870s : why Germany turned from liberalism to protectionism
Lehmann, Sibylle H. - 2009
In 1878 the liberal parties lost enough votes to loose the majority in the parliament which they had defended in the general election just one year before. In this paper, the question of where the voters came from and why the voting changed so crucially within one year are re-examined. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883662
Cover Image
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of coalition-proofness and robustness, as well as individual incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public-good provision can only depend on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348184
Cover Image
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
that come as a single indivisible unit, a monotonic social choice function cannot condition on preference intensities but … only on the population shares of people favoring one outcome over another. Any such social choice function can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348188
Cover Image
When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013
Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323844
Cover Image
Who is afraid of pirates? An experiment on the deterrence of innovation by imitation
Engel, Christoph; Kleine, Marco - 2013
In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now in most industries for most potential users, appropriating...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323854
Cover Image
Words substitute fists: Justifying punishment in a public good experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013
Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral - she does not benefit from contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323857
Cover Image
Deterrence by imperfect sanctions: A public good experiment
Engel, Christoph - 2013
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323867