Financial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed investment decisions. We investigate whether the appearance - the visual frame - of disclosure documents impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. In our experiment, subjects decide...

Financial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed investment decisions. We investigate whether the appearance - the visual frame - of disclosure documents impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. In our experiment, subjects decide...

The market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a hog cycle: in the short run, supply cannot be extended or limited; future law professors must be hired soon after they first present themselves, or leave the market; demand is inelastic. Using a comprehensive German dataset, we show that...

We present the results of an experiment on learning with minimal information. Particularly, subjects are only provided with feedback about their own payoff from the last period of the game being played, but not with information about the structure of the game. We compare the empirical structure...

Prices may differ between regional markets if transport capacities are limited. We develop a new approach to determine to which extent such differences stem from limited participation in cross-border trader, i.e. lack of integration, rather than from bottlenecks. This approach considers both...

This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agent´s betting reward depends on how accurately the prior...

We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We introduce salient but...

The market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a hog cycle: in the short run, supply cannot be extended or limited; future law professors must be hired soon after they first present themselves, or leave the market; demand is inelastic. Using a comprehensive German dataset, we show that...

We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We introduce salient but...

This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agentś betting reward depends on how accurately the prior...